Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire | 
 enlarge | Author: John N. Maclean
Publisher: Washington Square Press
Category: Book
List Price: $14.00
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Rating:  39 reviews
Sales Rank: 224125
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 288
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.7
Dimensions (in): 8.3 x 5.3 x 0.7
ISBN: 0743410386
Dewey Decimal Number: 363.379
EAN: 9780743410380
ASIN: 0743410386
Publication Date: September 1, 2000
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Amazon.com
Colorado and its neighboring states battle thousands of wildfires every year, scrub and sagebrush blazes often ignited by lightning strikes in the dry, hot days of summer. A vast, intertwined firefighting infrastructure combining local resources with agencies like the Forest Service and the BLM, reacts to these flare-ups as if going to war--and in theory, the coordination and communication ensures that fires are fought in the most efficient and safe manner possible. But while most wildfires in Colorado end up costing just over $60,000 on average with no loss of life, the catastrophic South Canyon fire of 1994 burned for 10 days, at the ultimate cost of $4.5 million and the lives of 14 firefighters. OSHA would later describe the coordinated action flatly as a "management failure," and concurrent investigations would reveal a tangled web of jealous rivalries, bureaucratic bungling, and severe morale problems. (One of the early on-scene supervisors would later tell investigators, "Leadership in this state sucks.") John Maclean (son of Norman Maclean, who wrote both A River Runs Through It and an award-winning account of Montana's deadly 1949 Mann Gulch fire) skillfully unfolds that summer's foreboding blow-by-blow. Fire on the Mountain weaves together a tense narrative of almost cinematic action, starring ballsy cowboy smokejumpers, frustrated federal middle managers, seasoned "hotshots" flown in like commandos, pissed-off tanker pilots, and well-intentioned but spin-wary politicians. Maclean's well-sketched personalities bring the action on the ground convincingly to life--and knowing up front that many of his main characters won't survive South Canyon makes this tragic tale that much more compelling. --Paul Hughes
Product Description
THE DRAMATIC TRUE ACCOUNT OF THE SOUTH CANYON FIRE -- THE DEVASTATING FOREST FIRE THAT TOOK THE LIVES OF FOURTEEN FIREFIGHTERS In this acclaimed bestseller of investigative journalism, John N. Maclean chronicles the deadly 1994 Colorado forest fire that was wrongly identified at the outset as occurring in South Canyon. This misidentification was the first in a string of seemingly minor human errors that would be compounded into one of the greatest tragedies in the annals of firefighting as fourteen men and women firefighters -- experts in their field -- lost their lives battling the South Canyon blaze. This stunning reconstruction of the fire and its aftermath, drawn from Maclean's exhaustive research and countless interviews, reveals fascinating insights into what went wrong, and how so many top-notch firefighters fell victim to nature at its most unforgiving. A page-turning adventure narrative brimming with action and intensity, Fire on the Mountain offers a powerful and indelible profile of a special breed of people who put their lives on the line as part of their daily jobs.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 34 more reviews...
 Fire on the Mountain July 29, 2008
I found the book compelling and I believe factual. I am sorry that this sacrefice did not stop another incident, the Thirty Mile Fire, where more were sacreficed. I was a fireman for a number of years and felt the power of an inferno that blistered my hands through my gloves but never faced anything like this. These are heros and special people who would trust and risk their lives to protect life and property of others. Circumstances through management decisions such as first not attempting to put the fire out when it was still not serious. I have climbed all over those mountains and it could have been done. Bad leadership decisions have taken thousands and thousands and continue to take more and more of our finest and brightest. When will they ever learn?
Great Book!!! Great Writing!!! Very Easy To Read!!! February 11, 2008
I found this book like so many others hard to put down. The author is very descriptive but very easy to read. I like this book because it is written so anyone can easily follow the events and description. I like books that are straight and to the point without all the fluff. This book has no fluff, just a good investigation into a difficult series of events.
 Gripping January 13, 2008
Norman Maclean's son does an okay job of telling the tragic story. Many of the events described are fragmented making the story jagged in places, but overall he gets the point across. Dedicated, hard working folks making the ultimate sacrifice. There are so many names tossed in and out of this book that you'll find yourself flipping back and forth trying to piece it together. John could have done a better job transitioning between events and making a stronger connection to the people in the book.
You'd like to think that this should never happen to firefighters, but the sad reality is that it does because it is dangerous work. As a firefighter, I found that John painted a very vivid picture of the events: 'The blood pounding in your head as you race up the hill', the lack of sleep the jumpers endure from their overnight 'coyote' the first night, etc. draws the reader's senses into the story for a gripping journey.
It's unfortunate to learn in Maclean's book that the crosses on Mann Gulch were nearly replaced with obelisks. Looking at the recent pictures of the Mann Gulch crosses in other sources - they appear at least to me that they are still in good shape. Today, the obelisks stand right beside the Mann Gulch crosses. Obelisks? What does that even signify? The crosses placed on Mann Gulch were how the 13 jumpers were first honored - let the original memorials stay! If this is about religion and separation of church and state, then I am totally disheartened to learn that smokejumping, one of the last decent traditions in our American work history, has gone PC. I hope that's not the case.
Anyway, this book should be read by all firefighters and those considering the job, especially the overhead.
Blowout! February 3, 2005
4 out of 11 found this review helpful
It started with dry lightning storm starting 40 new fires in the Grand Junction District with 5000 lightning strikes on Storm King Mountain before the fire and a total of 9,000 strikes total.
The BLM case is that other fires threatening homes required resource immediately and the South Canyon fire was not number one on the priority list; furthermore, BLM relied on County Helicopter support and availability from Western Slope Fire Coordination Center. The author tells about a tactic used by Blume where Blume would travel to Western Slope Fire Coordination Center identified which helicopters were on the pad, return to office, and place a call for the resource; the resource could not be denyed; games people play. What was needed to prevent such games was a join network of State and Fed with a central command hierarchy that could give stronger coordination during a crisis.
Therefore, it is logically that criticism would surface directing its anger at unclear procedures between state and federal agencies delayed deployment and usage of firefighting resources like failure to by the state too put out the fire because it had not cross its zone. Furthermore, criticism centers on these delays causing the small Storm King fire to expand from 30 acres to 50 acres to a crisis. When the smoke jumpers arrived at the fire scene they were startled at the size of the fire, however their "can do" attitude may have contributed to this underestimation of the problem. Brains are critical to fire survival and not just brawn. Smoke jumper could not be expected to back down from their jobs. Therefore, management must be held accountable for the disaster and their failure to recognized a crisis emerging and don't point the finger at the smoke jumpers. The reviewing commission says, "Twelve of the 18 Watch Out Situations were not recognized, or proper action was not taken" indicating that the firefighting crew was careless.
The smoke jumpers, BLM/Forrest service misjudgment could have been avoided by putting out the fire sooner. Immediate plane drops of retardant and helicopter support could have contributed significantly. Red mud retard was delivered by plane too late. The difficult wind currents made flyovers difficult caused by sudden drops in air pressure threatening to put the plane wing into the mountain.
Lack of immediate support delayed blue hat crews from arriving at the fire sight. Good black areas were too far from the fighting crews and super human efforts by the blue hats was not enough; the second group were able to power out to I-70 into safety.
"On July of 1994 had been a drought year and a time of low humidity. The fuels were extremely dry and susceptible to rapid and explosive spread. None of the groups recognized the dense oak spread as a potential for a blowup. A blow up is the perfect combination of fuel, high winds, and specific terrain topology. Cucou was monitoring the weather conditions on July 6: he predicted a cold front with winds of 45 mph passing through the fire zone around 3:30-4:00 pm. The weather information came in advance but did not trigger and evacuation. "A major blowup did occur on July 6 beginning at 4:00 p.m. Maximum rates of spread of 18 mph and flames as high as 200 to 300 feet made escape by firefighters extremely difficult."
On the west side the fire crossed the original fireline so BLM/Forest service started a second fireline further downhill on the east side of the ridge.
"At 3:20 p.m. a dry cold front moved into the fire area. As winds and fire activity increased, the fire made several rapid runs with 100-flame lengths within the existing burn. At 4:00 p.m. the fire crossed the bottom of the west drainage and spread up the drainage on the west side. It soon spotted back across the drainage to the east side beneath the firefighters and moved onto steep slopes and into dense, highly flammable Gambel oak. Within seconds a wall of flame raced up the hill toward the firefighters on the west flank fireline. Failing to outrun the flames, 12 firefighters perished. Two helitack crew-members on top of the ridge also died when they tried to outrun the fire to the northwest. The remaining 35 firefighters survived by escaping out the east drainage or seeking a safety area and deploying their fire shelters."
The smoke jumper elite were burned, a forbidden taboo; their story shows their incredible determination to survive; they lived their on the edge and lives with each other represented a close family bonds; the Storm King blowup was similar to the Mann Gulch blowup and no correlation translated to warn against a repeat occurrence; McKay was a hero; the escape routes were too long and steep with the worst part of the path achieving a 55 degree incline as the blue hat pace dropped to 1 per hour as the fire increased its velocity to 5 miles per hour; "the Prineville Interagency Hotshot Crew (out-of state-blue hats) was not briefed on local conditions, fuels, or fire weather forecasts before being sent to the South Canyon fire."; carry tools and equipment on the escape route reduced the pace and every second made the difference between reaching the ridge and death.
The book is captivating.
Still Learning July 31, 2004
6 out of 7 found this review helpful
Great reporting, decent literature although granted, few of us will ever match his father.
I know/knew many of the principals on this stage and what struck me was how well he captured them. Over and over, I'd read of another friend and easily picture them saying or doing what was in print, but now became very real.
I'm amazed by how much I missed after the official report and talking with some of those that were there. Mr. MacLean's book has rounded my education well. My oldest started fire fighting four years ago and I required reading of the report and this book so that he would understand the multiple levels that mistakes are made at.
To those that complain about faultfinding; how much fault has been found with "Fire on the Mountain"? Have there been any lawsuits, settlements or retractions? If none, then please list flaws so we can judge the validity of disputed items.
The only major flaw I saw in this book was failure to deal aggressively with the two jumpers who were not carrying fire shelters. Should have been at least a few pages devoted to that.
There is a huge reason for this book. The failing of management to report on and effectively deal with management's errors. This book fills part of that void.
Mr. MacLean, would you please do a book on Los Alamos and the Cerro Grande Fire? I was there for a couple weeks. The mistakes of the prescribed burn that got away would only be an appetizer to leads us to the corruption/incompetence of the Lab. That Lab is a far more important issue than wildland fire safety.
Whatever else, thank you for this book.
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